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Abstract
We present a methodology for the verification of multi-agent systems, whose properties are specified by means of a modal logic
that includes a temporal, an epistemic, and a modal operator to reason about correct behaviour of agents. The verification technique
relies on model checking via ordered binary decision diagrams. We present an implementation and report on experimental results
for two scenarios: the bit transmission problem with faults and the protocol of the dining cryptographers.
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1. Introduction
In the last two decades, the paradigm of multi-agent systems (MAS) has been employed successfully in several
disciplines, including, for example, philosophy, economics, and software engineering. One of the reasons for the use
of MAS formalisms in such different areas is the usefulness of ascribing autonomous and social behaviour to the
components of a system of agents. This allows us to abstract from the details of the components, and to focus on
the interaction among the various agents. The modelling of MAS in such scenarios is typically conducted by using
logic-based formalisms [1,2].
Besides abstracting and specifying the behaviour of a complex system by means of MAS formalisms based on
logic, recently researchers have been concerned with the problem of verifying MAS. Namely, if we model a real system
by means of a MAS formalism, how can we verify formally that the system complies with certain desired properties?
Formal verification is normally associated with traditional software engineering, where one wants to validate a piece
of software or hardware against a specification. One of the most successful formal techniques to verification is model
checking [3]. In this approach, a system S to be verified is represented by means of a logical model MS encoding the
computational traces of the system, and a property P to be checked is expressed via a logical formula ϕP . Verification
via model checking is defined as the problem of establishing whether or not MS |= ϕP . Various tools have been built to
perform this task automatically for temporal logic models (SMV [4], SPIN [5], NuSMV [6], and others), and several
concrete systems have been tested.
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model checking tools are tailored to standard reactive systems, and do not allow for the representation of the social
interaction and the autonomous behaviour of the agents. Specifically, traditional model checking tools assume that
MS is “simply” a temporal model, while MAS need more complex formalisms. Typically, in MAS we want to reason
about the epistemic, intentional, and doxastic properties of agents, as well as their temporal evolution. Hence, the
logical models required are richer than the temporal model used in traditional model checking.
In this paper we consider the formalism of interpreted systems [7] to reason about temporal and epistemic prop-
erties of agents, and an extension of interpreted systems with modal operators to reason about correct behaviour [8].
Based on this formalism, we extend the model checking algorithm that appeared in [9] and we present an implemen-
tation relying on Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs) to verify temporal, epistemic, and correct behaviour
modalities in interpreted systems.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we review the framework of deontic interpreted systems
and model checking via OBDDs. In Section 3 we introduce a technique for the verification of deontic interpreted
systems. An implementation of the algorithm is then discussed in Section 4. In Section 5 we test the soundness of our
implementation by means of two examples: the bit transmission problem with faults and the protocol of the dining
cryptographers. We discuss our results, in comparison with existing work, in Section 6, and we conclude in Section 7.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we briefly summarise the formalism of interpreted systems as presented in [7] to model MAS, and its
extension to reason about the correct behaviour of agents as presented in [10]. After this, we summarise the approach
to model checking via OBDDs.
2.1. Deontic interpreted systems and their temporal extension
An interpreted system [7] is a formalism representing a system of agents. Each agent i (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) in the system
is characterised by a finite set of local states Li and by a finite set of actions Acti . Actions are performed in compliance
with a protocol Pi :Li → 2Acti , specifying which actions may be performed in a given state. In this formalism, the
environment in which agents “live” may be modelled by means of a special agent E. Associated with E are a set of
local states LE , a set of actions ActE , and a protocol PE . A tuple g = (l1, . . . , ln, lE) ∈ L1 × · · · × Ln × LE , where
li ∈ Li for each i and lE ∈ LE , is called a global state and gives a description of the system at a particular instant of
time. This description assumes a “global” time and it has been proven useful in many circumstances [7] (approaches
in which time is local can be obtained by considering local clocks [11]).
The evolution of the agents’ local states is described by a function ti :Li ×LE × Act1 × · · · × Actn × ActE → Li ,
which returns a local state (the “next” local state) for agent i, given the “current” local state of the agent, the “current”
local state of the environment, and all the agents’ actions. Similarly, the evolution of the environment’s local states is
described by a function tE :LE × Act1 × · · · × Actn × ActE → LE . It is assumed that, in every state, agents evolve
simultaneously (such a composition is usually referred to as a lock-step system): the evolution of the global states of the
systems is described by a function t :S×Act → S, where S = L1 ×· · ·×Ln×LE , and Act = Act1 ×· · ·×Actn×ActE .
The function t is defined as t (g, a) = g′ iff for all i, ti(li (g), a) = li (g′) and tE(lE(g), a) = lE(g′), where li (g) denotes
the ith component of global state g (corresponding to the local state of agent i). Given a set I ⊆ S of possible initial
global states, a set G ⊆ S of reachable global states is generated by all the possible runs of the system.
In [10] the notion of correct behaviour of the agents is incorporated in the formalism. This is done by partitioning
the set of local states into two sets: a non-empty set Gi of allowed (or correct, or “green”) states, and a set Ri of
disallowed (or faulty, or “red”) states, such that Li = Gi ∪Ri , and Gi ∩Ri = ∅.
To complete the description of a MAS, a set of atomic propositions AP is introduced, together with a valuation
relation h ⊆ AP×S. Finally, given a set of agents Σ = {1, . . . , n}, we define a deontic interpreted system as the tuple:
DIS = 〈(Gi,Ri,Acti , Pi, ti)i∈Σ, (GE,RE,ActE,PE, tE), I, h
〉
.
It has been shown [7,10,12] that deontic interpreted systems can provide a semantics to reason about time, knowl-
edge, and correct behaviour.
We analyse multi-agent systems by means of the following language:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | EX(ϕ) | EGϕ | E(ϕUψ) | Kiϕ | EΓ ϕ | CΓ ϕ | DΓ ϕ | Oi(ϕ) | KˆΓ (ϕ).i
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that there exists a next state in which ϕ holds, and that there exists a run in which ϕ holds globally; E(ϕUψ) is a
temporal operator expressing that there exists a run in which ϕ holds until ψ holds; Γ denotes a non-empty subset
of the set of agents, Kiϕ is read as “agent i knows ϕ”, EΓ ϕ is read as “everybody in group Γ knows ϕ”, CΓ ϕ is
read as “it is common knowledge in Γ that ϕ”, and DΓ ϕ is read as “it is distributed knowledge in group Γ that ϕ”
[7]; Oiϕ expresses the fact that, under all the correct alternatives for agent i, ϕ holds; the operator KˆΓi expresses
the knowledge that agent i has on the assumption that all agents in Γ are functioning correctly. By slight abuse of
notation, if Γ is a singleton Γ = j , we write Kˆji , representing the knowledge of agent i under the assumption that
agent j is functioning correctly. Notice that Oi does not represent obligations of agent i to ϕ; we refer to [8] for more
details.
Given a deontic interpreted system DIS, we associate to DIS a model
MDIS = (W,Rt ,∼1, . . . ,∼n,RO1 , . . . ,ROn ,L)
that can be used to interpret any formula ϕ, as follows:
• The set of possible worlds W is the set G of reachable global states.
• The temporal relation Rt ⊆ W × W relating two worlds (i.e. two global states) is defined by considering the
temporal transition t . Two worlds w and w′ are such that Rt(w,w′) iff there exists a joint action a ∈ Act such
that t (g, a) = g′, where t is the transition relation of DIS.
• The epistemic accessibility relations ∼i⊆ W ×W are defined by considering the equality of the local components
of the global states. Two worlds w,w′ ∈ W are such that w ∼i w′ iff li (w) = li (w′) (i.e. two worlds w and w′ are
related via the epistemic relation ∼i when the local states of agent i in global states w and w′ are the same [7]).
• The accessibility relations ROi ⊆ W ×W are defined by considering the local ith component of the global state g′.
Two worlds w,w′ ∈ W are such that ROi (w,w′) iff li (g′) ∈ Gi .• The labelling relation L ⊆ AP ×W is equivalent to the valuation relation h.
Formulae can be interpreted in MDIS in a standard way [3,7,10]. Let π = (w0,w1, . . .) be an infinite sequence of
worlds such that for all i, Rt(wi,wi+1), and let π(i) denote the ith world in the sequence (notice that, following
standard conventions, we assume that the temporal relation is serial and thus all computation paths are infinite).
We write MDIS,w |= ϕ when a formula ϕ is true at a world w in a Kripke model MDIS, associated with a deontic
interpreted system DIS. Satisfaction is defined as follows.
MDIS,w |= p iff (p,w) ∈ L,
MDIS,w |= ¬ϕ iff MDIS,w  ϕ,
MDIS,w |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff either MDIS,w |= ϕ1 or MDIS,w |= ϕ2,
MDIS,w |= EXϕ iff there exists π such that π(0) = w, and MDIS,π(1) |= ϕ,
MDIS,w |= EGϕ iff there exists a path π such that π(0) = w, and MDIS,π(i) |= ϕ for all i  0,
MDIS,w |= E(ϕUψ) iff there exists a path π such that π(0) = w, and there exists k  0 such that
MDIS,π(k) |= ψ , and MDIS,π(j) |= ϕ for all 0 j < k,
MDIS,w |= Kiϕ iff for all w′ ∈ W, w ∼i w′ implies MDIS,w′ |= ϕ,
MDIS,w |= Oiϕ iff for all w′ ∈ W, ROi (w,w′) implies MDIS,w′ |= ϕ,
MDIS,w |= KˆΓi ϕ iff for all w′ ∈ W and for all j ∈ Γ, w ∼i w′ and ROj (w,w′) implies MDIS,w′ |= ϕ,
MDIS,w |= EΓ ϕ iff for all w′ ∈ W , REΓ (w,w′) implies MDIS,w′ |= ϕ,
MDIS,w |= CΓ ϕ iff for all w′ ∈ W, RCΓ (w,w′)′ implies MDIS,w′ |= ϕ,
MDIS,w |= DΓ ϕ iff for all w′ ∈ W , RDΓ (w,w′)′ implies MDIS,w′ |= ϕ.
In the definition above, the relation REΓ is defined as the union of the epistemic relations for the agents in Γ : REΓ =⋃
i∈Γ ∼i ; the relation RDΓ is defined as the intersection of the epistemic relations for agents in Γ : RDΓ =
⋂
i∈Γ ∼i ; the
relation RCΓ is the transitive closure of R
E
Γ . Other standard temporal modalities AX,EF,AF,AG,AU can be derived
in a standard way [3].
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We say that a formula ϕ is true in model and we write MDIS |= ϕ if MDIS,w |= ϕ for all w ∈ W . Similarly to [7],
we say that a formula ϕ is true in a deontic interpreted systems DIS, and we write DIS |= ϕ, if MDIS |= ϕ. Thus, a
formula is true in a deontic interpreted system if it is true in the associated Kripke model.
2.2. Model checking techniques
The problem of model checking can be defined as establishing whether or not a model M satisfies a formula ϕ
(M |= ϕ). Though M could be a model for any logic, traditionally the problem of building tools to perform model
checking automatically has been investigated mostly for temporal logics [3,13]. The model M is usually represented
by means of a dedicated programming language, such as PROMELA [5] and SMV [14]. In many approaches, the
model for the program is not built explicitly, but symbolically. Techniques to achieve this are based on ordered binary
decision diagrams, SAT translations [15], or other algebraic structures. These approaches are often referred to as
symbolic model checking techniques; other approaches exist, notably with automata [5]. For the purposes of this
paper, we review briefly symbolic model checking using OBDDs.
OBDDs are an efficient representation for the manipulation of boolean functions. As an example, consider the
boolean function a ∧ (b∨ c). The truth table of this function would be 8 lines long. Equivalently, one can evaluate the
truth value of this function by representing the function as a directed graph, as exemplified on the left-hand side of
Fig. 1. As it is clear from the picture, under certain assumptions, this graph can be simplified into the graph pictured
on the right-hand side of Fig. 1. This “reduced” representation is called the OBDD of the boolean function. Besides
offering a compact representation of boolean functions, OBDDs of different functions can be composed efficiently. In
[16] algorithms are provided for the manipulation and composition of OBDDs.
OBDDs are used in the verification of the model checking of systems specified by means of formulae of CTL, a
logic used to reason about branching time [13]. Here states of the model and relations are represented by means of
boolean formulae. A CTL formula is identified with a set of states: the states of the model satisfying the formula. As
a set of states can be represented as a boolean formula, each CTL formula can be characterised by a boolean formula.
Thus, the problem of model checking for CTL is reduced to the construction of boolean formulae. This is achieved
by composing OBDDs, or by computing fix-points of operators on OBDDs; we refer to [13] for the details. Using this
technique, systems with a state space in the region of 1040 have been verified. This technique will be extended in the
next section to the verification of deontic interpreted systems.
3. Model checking deontic interpreted systems
In this section we present an algorithm for the verification of temporal, epistemic, and correctness modalities for
MAS. Our approach is similar, in spirit, to the traditional model checking techniques for the logic CTL. Indeed, we
start by representing the various parameters of a deontic interpreted system by means of boolean formulae. Then, we
provide an algorithm based on this representation for the verification of formulae in the model associated with the
deontic interpreted system.
Given a deontic interpreted system:
DIS = 〈(Gi,Ri,Acti , Pi, ti)i∈Σ, (GE,RE,ActE,PE, tE), I, h
〉
note that the number nv(i) of boolean variables required to encode the local states of an agent i is nv(i) = log2 |Li |.
Similarly, to encode an agent’s action, the number na(i) of boolean variables wi required is na(i) = log2 |Acti |.
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a = (a1, . . . , an, ae) ∈ Act1 × · · · × Actn × ActE can be encoded as a boolean vector (w1, . . . ,wM), where1 M =∑
i na(i). In turn, a boolean vector can be identified with a boolean formula, represented by a conjunction of literals,
i.e. a conjunction of variables or their negation. In this way, a set of global states (or joint actions) can be expressed
as the disjunction of the boolean formulae encoding each global state in the set.
Having encoded local states, global states, and actions by means of boolean formulae, all the remaining parameters
can be expressed as boolean functions too. Indeed, since the protocols relate local states to sets of actions, they can
also be expressed as boolean formulae. Similarly, the evolution functions can be translated into boolean formulae.
The set of initial states is easily translated, while h can be translated into a boolean function which is true when a
proposition is true in a given global state.
In addition to the parameters presented above, the algorithm for model checking presented below requires the
definition of n boolean functions RKi (g, g′) (one for each agent) representing the epistemic accessibility relation, the
definition of n boolean functions ROi (g, g′) representing the accessibility relations for the correctness operator, and the
definition of a boolean function Rt(g, g′) representing the temporal transitions. Notice that we use the same symbols
ROi and Rt to denote relations in W ×W and boolean functions operating on boolean variables. The intended meaning
should be clear from the context. The boolean function Rt(g, g′) can be obtained from the evolution functions ti by
quantifying over actions. This quantification can be translated into a propositional formula using a disjunction (see [3]
for a similar approach to boolean quantification):
Rt(g, g
′) =
∨
a∈Act
[
(t (g, a, g′)∧ P(g, a)]
where P(g, a) is a boolean formula imposing that each component of the joint action a is consistent with the agents’
protocols in the global state g. The above gives the desired boolean relation between global states. The set of reachable
states is also needed by the algorithm: the set G of reachable global states can be expressed symbolically by a boolean
formula, and it can be computed as the fix-point of the operator
τ(Q) = (I (g)∨ ∃g′(Rt (g′, g)∧Q(g′)
)
.
The fix-point of τ can be computed by iterating from τ(∅) as standard (see [3]).
We now have all the ingredients in place to present the algorithm SAT(ϕ) to compute the set of global states
(expressed as a boolean formula) in which a formula ϕ holds, denoted by [[ϕ]]. The following are input parameters for
the algorithm:
• the boolean variables (v1, . . . , vN) and (w1, . . . ,wM) encoding global states and joint actions;
• the boolean functions Pi(v1, . . . , vN ,w1, . . . ,wM) encoding the protocols of the agents;
• the function h(p) returning the set of global states in which the atomic proposition p holds. We assume that the
global states are returned encoded as a boolean function of the variables (v1, . . . , vN);
• the set of initial states I , encoded as a boolean formula;
• the set of reachable states G, encoded as a boolean formula;
• the boolean function Rt encoding the temporal transition;
• n boolean functions encoding the accessibility relations RKi ;
• n boolean functions encoding the accessibility relations ROi .
The algorithm is as follows:
1 In this translation process the environment is treated as a standard agent.
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ϕ is an atomic formula: return h(ϕ);
ϕ is ¬ϕ1: return G \ SAT(ϕ1);
ϕ is ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2: return SAT(ϕ1)∩ SAT(ϕ2);
ϕ is EXϕ1: return SATEX(ϕ1);
ϕ is E(ϕ1Uϕ2): return SATEU(ϕ1, ϕ2);
ϕ is EGϕ1: return SATEG(ϕ1);
ϕ is Kiϕ1: return SATK(ϕ1, i);
ϕ is Oiϕ1: return SATO(ϕ1, i);
ϕ is KˆΓi ϕ1: return SATKH(ϕ1, i,Γ );
ϕ is EΓ ϕ1: return SATE(ϕ1,Γ );
ϕ is DΓ ϕ1: return SATD(ϕ1,Γ );
ϕ is CΓ ϕ1: return SATC(ϕ1,Γ );
}
In the algorithm above, SATEX , SATEG, SATEU are the standard procedures for CTL model checking [13], in which
the temporal relation is Rt and, instead of temporal states, global states are considered. The procedures SATK(ϕ, i),
SATO(ϕ, i), SATKH(ϕ, i,Γ ), SATE(ϕ,Γ ), SATD(ϕ,Γ ), and SATC(ϕ,Γ ) are defined using the appropriate accessi-
bility relation. These procedures are presented below.
SATK(ϕ, i) {
X = SAT(¬ϕ);
Y = {g ∈ G | ∃g′ ∈ X s.t. RKi (g, g′)}
return ¬Y ∩G;
}
SATO(ϕ, i) {
X = SAT(¬ϕ);
Y = {g ∈ G | ∃g′ ∈ X s.t. ROi (g, g′)}
return ¬Y ∩ G;
}
SATKH(ϕ, i,Γ ) {
X = SAT(¬ϕ);
Y = {g ∈ G | ∃g′ ∈ X s.t. RKi (g, g′) and ROj (g, g′) for all j ∈ Γ }
return ¬Y ∩ G;
}
SATE(ϕ,Γ ) {
X = SAT(¬ϕ);
Y = {g ∈ G | ∃g′ ∈ X s.t. REΓ (g,g′)}
return ¬Y ∩ G;
}
SATD(ϕ,Γ ) {
X = SAT(¬ϕ);
Y = {g ∈ G | ∃g′ ∈ X s.t. RDΓ (g,g′)}
return ¬Y ∩ G;
}
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X = SAT(ϕ);
Y = G;
while (X! = Y) {
X = Y;
Y = {g ∈ G | ∃g′ ∈ G s.t. g′ ∈ SAT(ϕ) and g′ ∈ X and REΓ (g,g′)}
}
return Y;
}
The procedure SATK(ϕ, i) operates by computing the set of global states X, corresponding the set of states in which
the negation of ϕ holds. Then, the procedure computes the pre-image of this set with respect to the epistemic relation
∼i and returns the complement of this set with respect to the set of reachable states (this algorithm is based on the
efficient implementation of the procedure to compute existential boolean quantifications; see [16,17]). The proce-
dures SATO(ϕ, i), SATKH(ϕ, i,Γ ), SATE(ϕ,Γ ), and SATD(ϕ,Γ ) implement a similar algorithm for the modalities
Oi, Kˆ
Γ
i ,EΓ , and DΓ .
The procedure SATC(ϕ,Γ ) is based on the equivalence [7]
CΓ ϕ ⇔ EΓ (ϕ ∧CΓ ϕ)
which implies that [[CΓ ϕ]] is the fix-point of the (monotonic) operator τ(Q) = [[EΓ (ϕ ∧ (Q))]]. Hence, [[CΓ ϕ]] can
be obtained by iterating τ(G).
Notice that all the parameters can be encoded as OBDDs. Moreover, all the operations inside the algorithms can be
performed on OBDDs.
The algorithm presented here computes the set of states in which a formula holds, but we are usually interested in
checking whether or not a formula holds in the whole model. SAT can be used to verify whether or not a formula ϕ
holds in a model by comparing two set of states: the set SAT(ϕ) and the set of reachable states G. As sets of states are
expressed as OBDDs, verification in a model is reduced to the comparison of the OBDDs for SAT(ϕ) and for G.
4. Implementation
In this section we introduce MCMAS, a tool that implements the algorithms presented in Section 3. MCMAS is
released under the terms of the GNU General Public License (GPL); the implementation is available for download
[18].
In MCMAS, deontic interpreted systems are described by using the language ISPL (Interpreted Systems Program-
ming Language). Fig. 2 gives a short example of this language. We refer to the files available online [18] for the full
syntax of ISPL. Formulae to be checked are provided at the end of the specification file, using an intuitive syntax.
Fig. 3 lists the main components of MCMAS. Steps 2 to 6, inside the dashed box, are performed automatically upon
invocation of the tool. These steps are coded mainly in C++. and can be summarised as follows:
• In step 2, the input ISPL file is parsed using standard tools. In this step various parameters are stored in temporary
lists; such parameters include agents’ names, local states, actions, protocols, etc.
• In step 3, the lists obtained in step 2 are traversed to build the OBDDs for the verification algorithm. OBDDs are
created and manipulated using the CUDD library [17]. In this step the number of variables needed to represent
local states and actions are computed; following this, all the OBDDs are built by translating the boolean formulae
for protocols, evolution functions, valuation, etc. Also, the set of reachable states is computed using the operator
τ presented in Section 3.
• In step 4, the formulae to be checked are read from a text file, and parsed appropriately.
• In step 5, verification is performed by running the algorithm of Section 3. At the end of step 5, an OBDD repre-
senting the set of states in which a formula holds is computed.
• In step 6, the OBDD for the set of reachable states is compared with the OBDD corresponding to each formula. If
the two are equivalent, the formula holds in the model and the tools produce a positive output. If the two are not
equivalent, the tool produces a negative output.
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Lstate = {s0,s1,s2,s3};
Lgreen = {s0,s1,s2};
Action = {a1,a2,a3};
Protocol:
s0: {a1};
s1: {a2};
s2: {a1,a3};
s3: {a2,a3};
end Protocol
Ev:
s2 if ((AnotherAgent.Action=a7);
s3 if Lstate=s2;
end Ev
end Agent
Fig. 2. ISPL example.
Fig. 3. Software structure.
MCMAS can be run from the command line, and accepts various options to modify verbosity, to inspect OBDDs
statistics and memory usage, to enable variable reordering in the OBDDs (see [17]), etc. These options can be used to
determine the “critical” points, and to fine tune the performance of the tool.
MCMAS is written in C/C++ and it has been successfully compiled on various platforms, including PowerPC (Mac
OS X 10.2 and 10.3), Intel (various Pentium versions using Linux 2.4 and 2.6), and SPARC (SunOS 5.8 and 5.9). The
source code has been compiled with gcc/g++ from version 2.95 till version 3.4.
5. Examples
In this section we exemplify and evaluate MCMAS by means of two examples: the bit transmission problem and the
protocol of the dining cryptographers.
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In the bit-transmission problem [7] a sender S wants to send the value of a bit to a receiver R, by using an unreliable
communication channel. In this example, the channel may drop messages, but cannot tamper messages. One protocol
for achieve communication is as follows. S immediately starts sending the bit to R, and continues to do so until
it receives an acknowledgement from R. R does nothing until it receives the bit; from then on, it sends messages
acknowledging the receipt to S. S stops sending the bit to R when it receives the first acknowledgement from R.
This scenario is extended in [8] to deal with failures. In particular, here we assume that R may fail to behave as
intended. There are different kinds of faults that we can consider for R. Following [8], we discuss two examples; in the
first, R may fail to send acknowledgements when it receives a message. In the second, R may send acknowledgements
even if it has not received any message.
5.1.1. Deontic interpreted systems for the bit transmission problem
It is possible to represent the scenario described above by means of the formalism of deontic interpreted systems
to reason about the correct behaviour of the components, as presented in [8]. To this end, a third agent called E (en-
vironment) is introduced to model the unreliable communication channel. The local states of the environment record
the possible combinations of messages that have been sent in a round, either by S or R. Hence, four possible local
states are taken for the environment: LE = {(.,.), (sendbit,.), (.,sendack), (sendbit, sendack)}, where ‘.’ represents
configurations in which no message has been sent by the corresponding agent. The actions ActE for the environment
correspond to the transmission of messages between S and R on the unreliable communication channel. It is assumed
that the communication channel can transmit messages in both directions simultaneously, and that a message travelling
in one direction can get through while a message travelling in the opposite direction is lost. The set of actions ActE
for the environment can be taken as ActE = {S−R, S→,←R,−}. The action S−R represents the action in which the
channel transmits any message successfully in both directions. The action S→ represents a successful communication
from S to R but unsuccessful from R to S. The action ←R represents a successful communication from R to S but
unsuccessful from S to R. Finally, the action – represents the environment stopping messages in either direction. We
assume the following constant function for the protocol of the environment PE :
PE(lE) = ActE = {S−R, S→,←R,−}, for all lE ∈ LE.
The evolution function for E records simply the actions of Sender and Receiver.
We model sender S by considering the set LS = {0,1, (0,ack), (1,ack)} consisting of four possible local states.
They represent the value of the bit S is attempting to transmit, and whether or not S has received an acknowledgement
from R.
The set of actions ActS for S can be taken as ActS = {sendbit(0), sendbit(1), λ}; they represent the action of sending
a bit of value 0, the action of sending a bit of value 1, and the null action.
The protocol for S is defined as follows:
PS(0) = sendbit(0), PS(1) = sendbit(1),
PS
(
(0,ack)
)= PS
(
(1,ack)
)= λ.
The transition conditions for S are listed in Table 1.
We now consider two possible faulty behaviours for R.
Faulty receiver—1: In this case we assume that R may fail to send acknowledgements when it is supposed to. To
this end, we introduce the following local states for R: L′R = {0,1, ε, (0, f ), (1, f )}. The state ε is used to record the
Table 1
Transition conditions for S
Final state Transition condition
(0,ack) (LS = 0 and ActR = sendack and ActE = S−R) or
(LS = 0 and ActR = sendack and ActE = ←R)
(1,ack) (LS = 1 and ActR = sendack and ActE = S−R) or
(LS = 1 and ActR = sendack and ActE = ←R)
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Transition conditions for R
Final state Transition condition
0 (ActS = sendbit(0) and LR = ε and ActE = S−R) or
(ActS = sendbit(0) and LR = ε and ActE = S→)
1 (ActS = sendbit(1) and LR = ε and ActE = S−R) or
(ActS = sendbit(1) and LR = ε and ActE = S→)
(0, f ) LR = 0 and ActR = ε
(1, f ) LR = 1 and ActR = ε
fact that in the run R has not received any message from S yet; 0 and 1 denote the value of the bit received. The local
states (i, f ) (i = {0,1}) are faulty or red states denoting that, at some point in the past, R received a bit but failed to
send an acknowledgement.
We model the set of allowed actions for R as ActR = {sendack, λ} and its protocol for R as:
P ′R(ε) = λ,P ′R(0) = P ′R(1) = {sendack, λ},
P ′R
(
(0, f )
)= P ′R
(
(1, f )
)= {sendack, λ}.
The transition conditions for R are listed in Table 2.
Faulty receiver—2: In this second case we assume that R may send acknowledgements without having received a
bit first. We model this scenario with the following set of local states L′′R for R:
L′′R =
{
0,1, ε, (0, f ), (1, f ), (ε, f )
}
.
The meaning of the local states ε,0,1, (0, f ) and (1, f ) is as above; (ε, f ) is a further faulty state corresponding to
the fact that, at some point in the past, R sent an acknowledgement without having received a bit first. The actions
allowed are the same as in the previous example. The protocol is defined as follows:
P ′′R(ε) = {sendack, λ},
P ′′R(0) = P ′′R(1) = sendack,
P ′′R
(
(0, f )
)= P ′′R
(
(1, f )
)= P ′′R
(
(ε, f )
)= {sendack, λ}.
The evolution function is a simple extension of Table 2.
For more details of both cases we refer to [8].
For both examples, we introduce the following atomic propositions: AP = {bit = 0,bit = 1, recbit, recack}. Cor-
respondingly, we introduce the following valuation function:
h(bit = 0) = {g ∈ G | either lS(g) = 0 or lS(g) = (0,ack)
}
,
h(bit = 1) = {g ∈ G | either lS(g) = 1 or lS(g) = (1,ack)
}
,
h(recbit) = {g ∈ G | either lR(g) = 1, or lR(g) = 0, or lR(g) = (0, f ) or lR(g) = (1, f )
}
,
h(recack) = {g ∈ G | lS(g) = (1,ack) or lS(g) = (0,ack)
}
.
The parameters above describe two deontic interpreted systems, one for each faulty behaviour of R; we refer to these
deontic interpreted systems with DISBTP1 and DISBTP2.
Given the set AP above, we can evaluate various properties of DISBTP1 and DISBTP2 hold. For example, consider
the following temporal and epistemic specifications:
(1)AG(recack → (KS
(
KR(bit = 0)∨KR(bit = 1)
)))
,
(2)AG(recack → (KˆRS
(
KR(bit = 0)∨KR(bit = 1)
)))
.
Formula (1) captures the fact that it is always true that, upon receipt of an acknowledgement, S knows that R knows
the value of the bit. Formula (2) expresses a similar concept, but by using knowledge under the assumption of correct
behaviour. In Section 5.3 we will verify in an automatic way that Formula (1) holds in DISBTP1 but not in DISBTP2.
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Formula (2) holds in both DISBTP1 and DISBTP2; hence, a particular form of knowledge is retained irrespective of the
fault under consideration.
5.2. The protocol of the dining cryptographers
The protocol of the dining cryptographers was introduced in [19], and model checking of its properties was dis-
cussed in [20]. We report the original wording from [19].
“Three cryptographers are sitting down to dinner at their favourite three-star restaurant. Their waiter informs them
that arrangements have been made with the maitre d’hotel for the bill to be paid anonymously. One of the cryp-
tographers might be paying for the dinner, or it might have been NSA (US National Security Agency). The three
cryptographers respect each other’s right to make an anonymous payment, but they wonder if NSA is paying. They
resolve their uncertainty fairly by carrying out the following protocol:
Each cryptographer flips an unbiased coin behind his menu, between him and the cryptographer on his right, so
that only the two of them can see the outcome. Each cryptographer then states aloud whether the two coins he can
see—the one he flipped and the one his left-hand neighbour flipped—fell on the same side or on different sides. If
one of the cryptographers is the payer, he states the opposite of what he sees. An odd number of differences uttered
at the table indicates that a cryptographer is paying; an even number indicates that NSA is paying (assuming that
the dinner was paid for only once). Yet if a cryptographer is paying, neither of the other two learns anything from
the utterances about which cryptographer it is.” [19]
The aim of this protocol is to allow anonymous broadcasting of messages. Notice that the same protocol works for
any number of cryptographers greater or equal to three (see [19]).
For the purposes of this paper, we consider a variation of the protocol in which we assume that the first cryptogra-
pher may be faulty.
5.2.1. Deontic interpreted system for the dining cryptographers
We introduce three agents Ci (i = {1,2,3}) to model the three cryptographers, and one agent E for the environment.
In our representation the environment is used to select non-deterministically the identity of the payer and the results of
the coin tosses. This makes a total of 32 possible local states for the environment. We assume that the environment can
perform only one action, the null action. Therefore, the protocol is simply mapping every local state to the null action.
Also, there is no evolution of the local states for the environment. We model the local states of the cryptographers as a
string containing three parameters representing, respectively, whether or not the coins that a cryptographer can see are
equal, whether or not the cryptographer is the payer, and the number of “different” utterances reported. Considering
that all these parameters are not initialised at the beginning of the run, there are 27 possible combinations of these,
hence 27 possible local states are required for every agent. For each cryptographer, the actions allowed are “say
nothing”, “say equal”, “say different”, and these actions are performed in compliance with the protocol stated above.
We refer to the ISPL code available online for the details of the protocol and of the evolution function.
We define the following set of atomic propositions to reason about this scenario: AP = {paid1,paid2,paid3, even,
odd} and consider the following valuation function:
h(paid1) =
{
g ∈ G | lC1(g) = 〈∗Paid∗〉
}
,
h(paid2) =
{
g ∈ G | lC2(g) = 〈∗Paid∗〉
}
,
h(paid3) =
{
g ∈ G | lC2(g) = 〈∗Paid∗〉
}
,
h(even) = {g ∈ G | lCi (g) = 〈∗Even∗〉 for every i
}
,
h(odd) = {g ∈ G | lCi (g) = 〈∗Odd∗〉 for every i
}
.
〈∗Paid∗〉 denotes a local state in which the string contains the value Paid (i.e. the cryptographer paid for dinner).
〈∗Even∗〉 and 〈∗Odd∗〉 are defined similarly. We can now express formally various properties of this deontic inter-
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DISDC1 |= (odd ∧ ¬paid1) → AX
(
KC1(paid2 ∨ paid3)∧ ¬KC1(paid2)∧ ¬KC1(paid3)
)
.
This formula expresses the claim made at the beginning of this section: if the first cryptographer did not pay for dinner
and the number of “different” utterances is odd, then the first cryptographer knows that either the second or the third
cryptographer paid for dinner; moreover, in this case, the first cryptographer does not know which of these two is the
payer. Analogously, it is possible to check that, if a cryptographer paid for dinner, then there will be an odd number
of “different” utterances, that is:
DISDC1 |= (paid1 ∨ paid2 ∨ paid3) → AF(odd).
Consider now the group Γ of the three cryptographers. An interesting property to check is the following:
DISDC1 |= even → AX
(
CΓ (¬paid1 ∧ ¬paid2 ∧ ¬paid3)
)
.
This formula expresses the fact that, in presence of an even number of “different” utterances, it is common knowledge
that none of the cryptographers paid for the dinner. Hence, in this protocol common knowledge can be achieved
anonymously.
Finally, we consider the case where C1 may not follow its protocol, and say the opposite of what he should. This
faulty behaviour may be described by another deontic interpreted system, denoted with DISDC2. We do not give the
description of DISDC2 explicitly; it is similar, in spirit, to DISBTP2 and the code is available online. In this case we
have that:
DISDC2  (odd ∧ paid2) → AX
(
K2(paid1 ∨ paid3)∧ ¬K2(paid1)∧ ¬K2(paid3)
)
.
However, if C2 assumes that C1 and C3 are working correctly, the following formula is true:
DISDC2 |= (odd ∧ paid2) → AX
(
Kˆ
{1,3}
2 (paid1 ∨ paid3)∧ ¬Kˆ{1,3}2 (paid1)∧ ¬Kˆ{1,3}2 (paid3)
)
.
All the above formulae were correctly verified by the tool.
5.3. Experimental results
In this section we present the experimental results obtained with MCMAS for the verification of the examples in
Sections 5.1 and 5.2. To evaluate the performance of the tool, we analyse space and time requirements. Following
standard conventions, we define the size of a deontic interpreted system as |DIS| = |S| + |R|, where |S| is the size of
the state space and |R| is the size of the relations. In our case, we define |S| as the number all the possible combinations
of local states and actions.
5.3.1. Experimental results for the bit transmission problem
We have encoded the deontic interpreted systems and the formulae introduced in Section 5.1 in ISPL. Appendix A
reports a coding of DISBTP1 in ISPL. MCMAS correctly reported DISBTP1 as satisfying both formulae, and DISBTP2 as
not satisfying Formula (1), while satisfying Formula (2).
In this example there are 4 local states and 3 actions for S, 5 (or 6) local states and 2 actions for R, and 4 local
states and 4 actions for E. In total, we have |S| ≈ 2 ·103. To define |R| consider the sum of the temporal, the epistemic
and the deontic relations. We approximate |R| as |S|2, hence |M| = |S| + |R| ≈ |S|2 ≈ 4 · 106.
To quantify the memory requirements we consider the maximum number of nodes allocated to the OBDDs. Notice
that this figure over-estimates the number of nodes required to encode the state space and the relations. Further, we
report the total memory used by the tool (in MBytes). The formulae of both DISBTP1 and DISBTP2 required a similar
amount of memory and nodes. The average experimental results are reported in Table 3.
In addition to space requirements, we carried out some tests on time requirements. The running time is the sum of
the time required for building all the OBDDs for the parameters and the actual running time for the verification. We
ran the tool on a 1.2 GHz AMD Athlon with 256 MBytes of RAM, running Debian Linux with kernel 2.4.20. The
average results are listed in Table 4.
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Memory requirements for the bit transmission problem
|M| OBDDs nodes Memory (MBytes)
≈ 4 · 106 ≈ 103 ≈ 4.5
Table 4
Running time (for one formula) for the bit transmission problem
Model construction Verification Total
0.045 sec <0.01 sec 0.05 sec
Table 5
Memory requirements for the protocol of the dining cryptographers
N.Crypt. |M| OBDDs nodes Memory (MBytes)
3 ≈ 7 · 1013(46) ≈ 104 ≈ 4.4
4 ≈ 2 · 1018(62) ≈ 6 · 104 ≈ 5.2
5 ≈ 2 · 7.522(76) ≈ 8 · 104 ≈ 5.6
6 ≈ 1.2 · 1027(90) ≈ 1.6 · 105 ≈ 7.1
7 ≈ 2 · 1031(104) ≈ 1.7 · 105 ≈ 7.5
8 ≈ 1.3 · 1036(120) ≈ 1.2 · 107 ≈ 230
Table 6
Running time (for one formula) for the protocol of the dining cryptographers
N.Crypt. Model construction Verification Total
3 1.1 sec 0.1 sec 1.2 sec
4 5.1 0.1 5.2
5 18.7 0.1 18.8
6 125.9 0.2 126.2
7 649 0.1 649
8 9643 1 9644
5.3.2. Experimental results for the protocol of the dining cryptographers
We have encoded the interpreted systems introduced in Section 5.2 in ISPL (a copy of the code is included in the
downloadable files). It is not difficult to extend the description of the system to a number of cryptographers greater
than three. In this section we take advantage of this fact to perform an evaluation of the scalability of MCMAS.
Similarly to the previous section, we define the size of the model as |M| = |S| + |R|. We tested the formulae
presented in Section 5.2.1 (more tests can be found in [18]); they were all correctly verified. The experimental results
for memory and time requirements are reported in Tables 5 and 6.
6. Related work and discussion
Various ideas have previously been put forward to verify MAS. In [21], M. Wooldridge et al. present the MABLE
language for the specification of MAS. In this work, non-temporal modalities are translated into nested data structures
(in the spirit of [22]). A similar approach can be found in Bordini et al. [23]: in this work, a modified version of the
AgentSpeak(L) language [24] is used to specify agents and to exploit existing model checkers. Both the works of
M. Wooldridge et al. and of Bordini et al. use the temporal model checker SPIN to perform an automatic verification.
The works of van der Meyden and Shilov [25], and van der Meyden and Su [20], are concerned with verification
of interpreted systems. They consider the verification of a particular class of interpreted systems, namely the class
of synchronous systems with perfect recall. An algorithm for model checking is introduced in the first paper using
automata, and [20] suggests the use of ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs) for this approach. Recently, the tool
MCK [26] has been developed to implement the techniques of [20].
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model MAS. An algorithm for bounded model checking a subset of CTLK (a logic that augments the standard CTL
with epistemic modalities) is introduced in [27] and an implementation is provided in [28], while [29] extends [27]
by considering modalities to reason about the “correct behaviour” of agents in the formalism of deontic interpreted
systems. An algorithm for unbounded model checking of the full language of CTLK is introduced in [30].
This paper differs from the works above in various respects. Differently from [21,23], instead of relying on existing
model checkers, we extend the algorithms that appeared in [9] and we present an implementation of the algorithms
to verify properties of MAS that is self-contained. We argue that it is more natural to express properties such as
knowledge and correct behaviour directly, instead of translating a MAS system (and its properties) into temporal
structures.
Our implementation uses OBDDs and, in this respect, our work differs from all the SAT-based approaches. Although
[26] does use OBDDs, it restricts the verification to a particular class of interpreted systems, and does not consider
operators to reason about the “correct behaviour” of agents, as we do here.
Unfortunately, due to the difference in semantics for MAS, it is currently impossible to compare MCMAS’s
performance with other model checkers for MAS (such as MCK [26] and Verics [28,31]) on common examples.
Conventional model checkers for temporal logics have been employed to verify MAS scenarios, by translating MAS
specifications into pure-temporal specifications [21]. Performance comparisons between MCMAS and other temporal-
only model checkers is thus limited to simple examples, such as the bit transmission problem, for which it is possible
to provide a “temporal” translation. However, the small size of the example does not allow for meaningful results. The
translation of the protocol of the dining cryptographer (with a number of cryptographers greater than 5) would allow
for better comparisons, but its feasibility is limited by the huge size of the temporal description for such examples.
Though we lack meaningful comparisons, the results presented in Section 5.3 show that MCMAS allows for the
verification on examples whose size would be intractable with non-symbolic model checkers. For the case of the
dining cryptographers, the difference in performance between 7 and 8 cryptographers shown in Table 6 is caused by
the failure of the OBDD library in finding a compact order for the boolean variables in a reasonable time. This, in turn,
causes MCMAS to store larger data structures, which consume considerably more processing time.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have extended a major verification technique for reactive systems—symbolic model checking via
OBDDs—to verify non-temporal properties of multi-agent systems. We presented an OBDD-based technique for the
verification of MAS modelled in the formalism of deontic interpreted systems, a programming language for deontic
interpreted systems (ISPL), and a tool implementing these ideas (MCMAS).
We tested our implementation by means of two examples: the bit transmission problem with faults and the protocol
of the dining cryptographers. These examples suggested that our framework can be employed successfully in the
analysis of communication and security protocols.
The scalability results from the second examples are encouraging, and we believe that this verification methodology
may be applied in various real-life scenarios.
Appendix A. ISPL code for DISBTP1
Agent Sender
Lstate = {s0,s1,s0ack,s1ack};
Lgreen = {s0,s1,s0ack,s1ack};
Action = {sb0,sb1,nothing};
Protocol:
s0: {sb0};
s1: {sb1};
s0ack: {nothing};
s1ack: {nothing};
end Protocol
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s0ack if ( ( (Lstate=s0) and (Receiver.Action=sendack) and [...]
or ( (Lstate=s0) and (Receiver.Action=sendack) [...] ) );
s1ack if ( ( (Lstate=s1) and (Receiver.Action=sendack) and [...]
[...]
end Ev
end Agent
Agent Receiver
Lstate = {empty,r0,r1,r0f,r1f};
Lgreen = {empty,r0,r1};
Action = {nothing,sendack};
Protocol:
empty: {nothing};
r0: {sendack,nothing};
r1: {sendack,nothing};
r0f: {sendack,nothing};
r1f: {sendack,nothing};
end Protocol
Ev:
r0 if ( ( (Sender.Action=sb0) and (Lstate=empty) and [...]
r1 if ( ( (Sender.Action=sb1) and (Lstate=empty) and [...]
r0f if ( (Lstate = r0 ) and (Action=nothing) );
r1f if ( (Lstate = r1 ) and (Action=nothing) );
end Ev
end Agent
Agent Environment
Lstate = {S,R,SR,none};
Lgreen = {S,R,SR,none};
Action = {S,SR,R,none};
Protocol:
S: {S,SR,R,none};
R: {S,SR,R,none};
SR: {S,SR,R,none};
none: {S,SR,R,none};
end Protocol
Ev:
S if ( ( (Sender.Action=sb0) or (Sender.Action=sb1) ) and
(Receiver.Action=nothing));
SR if [...]
[...]
end Ev
end Agent
Evaluation
recbit if ( (Receiver.Lstate=r0) or (Receiver.Lstate=r1) or
(Receiver.Lstate=r0f) or (Receiver.Lstate=r1f) );
recack if ( (Sender.Lstate=s0ack) or (Sender.Lstate=s1ack) );
bit0 if ( (Sender.Lstate=s0) or (Sender.Lstate=s0ack));
bit1 if ( (Sender.Lstate=s1) or (Sender.Lstate=s1ack) );
end Evaluation
InitStates
( (Sender.Lstate=s0) or (Sender.Lstate=s1) ) and
( Receiver.Lstate=empty ) and
250 F. Raimondi, A. Lomuscio / Journal of Applied Logic 5 (2007) 235–251( Environment.Lstate=none );
end InitStates
Groups
g1 = {Sender,Receiver};
end Groups
Formulae
AG(recack -> ( K(Sender,K(Receiver,bit0) or K(Receiver,bit1))));
AG(recack -> ( KH(Sender,Receiver,K(Receiver,bit0) or K(Receiver,bit1))));
end Formulae
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